Building on the trade-o¤ between agency costs and monitoring costs, we develop a dynamic theory of optimal capital structure with …nancial distress and reorganization. Costly monitoring eliminates the agency friction and thus the risk of ine¢ cient liquidation. Our key assumption is that monitoring cannot be applied instantaneously. Rather, transitions between agency and monitoring are subject to search frictions. In the optimal contract, the …rm seeks a monitoring opportunity whenever it is …nancially distressed, i.e., when the risk of liquidation is high. If a monitoring opportunity arrives in time, the manager is dismissed, the capital structure is reorganized as in Chapter 11 bankruptcy, and the search for a new manager begins. In agency, an optimal capital structure consists of equity, long-term debt, contingent long-term debt, and a credit line with performance pricing. In …nancial distress, coupon payments to contingent debt are suspended but the interest rate on the credit line is stepped-up, which gives the …rm simultaneously debt relief and a steep incentive to improve its …nancial position. An episode of distress can end with …nancial recovery, transition to bankruptcy reorganization, or liquidation.
Introduction
In …nancial distress, a …rm is much more likely to seek to reorganize its capital structure and continue to operate rather than to stop its operations and liquidate. 1 Modern theories of optimal capital structure of the …rm, built around resolving dynamic agency problems, however, allow only for …nancial recovery or liquidation and do not consider the possibility of exiting …nancial distress by …nancial reorganization. In this paper, our objective is to take a step toward bridging this gap.
We build a dynamic model in which an optimal capital structure, in the spirit of Jensen (1986) , is determined by the trade-o¤ between agency costs and monitoring costs. To model agency costs, we follow DeMarzo and Sannikov (2006) , DeMarzo and Fishman (2007) , and Biais et al. (2007) in solving an optimal contracting problem between the …rm owners and a manager who can divert funds to private use. To provide incentives, an optimal contract must credibly threaten (ex-post ine¢ cient) liquidation. We model monitoring as an alternative to agency that eliminates the risk of liquidation but entails direct costs.
Our key assumption is that monitoring cannot be applied instantaneously. Rather, transitions between agency and monitoring are subject to search frictions. That is, agency and monitoring are states. Under an optimal contract, in the agency state, the …rm seeks a monitoring opportunity whenever it is …nancially distressed, i.e., when the risk of liquidation is high. If a transition to monitoring arrives in time, the …rm's cash ‡ows become publicly observable, and the manager is dismissed. If such a transition does not arrive in time, the …rm is forced to liquidate, as in the standard model. The monitoring costs incurred in the monitoring state are su¢ ciently high for the …rm to seek to hire a new manager and transition to the agency state again.
In agency, an optimal capital structure consists of equity, long-term debt, contingent long-term debt, and a credit line with performance pricing. Financial distress is de…ned by a leverage trigger, i.e., when the balance on the credit line exceeds a threshold. When the balance remains above the distress threshold, the interest rate on the credit line is elevated but coupon payments on contingent debt are suspended. The …rm issues enough contingent debt ex ante that these two interest rate adjustments imply a net relief in terms of the debt servicing costs to the …rm in distress. This relief moderates the risk of liquidation and helps cover any expenses related to preparation for transition to the monitoring state. An episode of distress can end with …nancial recovery, a transition to monitoring, or in liquidation that takes place if the …rm is unable to transition to monitoring before it exhausts its total credit limit.
In the monitoring state, as in Chapter 11 bankruptcy, the …rm reorganizes its capital structure while paying the costs of monitoring its cash ‡ow and searching for an opportunity to emerge from bankruptcy with a new capital structure and a new manager. Upon transitioning to agency again, new debt is issued and new equity is allocated to the owners and the new manager.
This optimal capital structure and the conditions under which the …rm searches for an opportunity to replace management and reorganize, i.e., our de…nition of …nancial distress, are determined endogenously by the trade-o¤ between agency and monitoring costs.
Our theory provides a new explanation of the role of performance pricing and contingent debt in the …rm's capital structure, which we view as the main contribution of this paper. The optimality of performance pricing and the suspension of contingent debt coupon payments in …nancial distress is a consequence of the jump that the manager's continuation value experiences under the optimal contract upon a transition to monitoring. Although we allow for a severance payment to the manager, the optimal contract calls for zero severance, as this way the manager's loss of value at the transition to monitoring is maximized. Prior to the transition, this loss is compensated with higher expected growth (drift) of the manager's continuation value, which helps reduce the risk of liquidation. When leverage is high, i.e., the draw on the credit line is above the distress threshold, the …rm searches for a transition to bankruptcy reorganization and the manager faces a positive probability of being instantaneously dismissed with no severance. When leverage is low, i.e., the credit balance is below the distress threshold, the …rm is …nancially sound, does not search for bankruptcy, and the manager faces no risk of being dismissed. This di¤erence between distress and …nancially sound conditions gives a role for performance pricing and contingent debt in our model. Contingent debt that we obtain as a part of an optimal capital structure shares features with contingent convertible (CoCo) bonds, which have recently been introduced into bank capital structures in Asia and Europe, and have received a lot of attention from regulators an academics. 2 The main similarity is the idea of providing a "going concern" capital relief to a …rm in …nancial distress. In our model, the contingent debt contract mandates a (noncumulative) suspension of coupon payments, based on an accounting trigger, similar to many CoCo bonds used in practice. Conversion to equity or a write-down at default, although feasible, are not essential features of the optimal capital structure in our model. 3 We compute security values and comparative statics. The option to seek monitoring and 2 See, e.g., Flannery (2005 Flannery ( , 2014 , Hanson et al. (2011 . 3 In non-bank capital structures, the function of contingent capital is often assumed by preferred equity. In our model, di¤erences between contingent debt and preferred equity are relatively minor. We discuss them in the Appendix. reorganization makes the …rm's securities less risky. While the total debt capacity of the …rm is increased, the optimal size of the credit line is shorter, allowing the …rm to pay dividends sooner and making the risk of liquidation lower. Valuation of the …rm's securities depends on their seniority structure in reorganization or liquidation. For example, if contingent debt is junior to uncontingent long-term debt, the latter form of debt becomes much less risky. Using an example, we show that the optimal contract may actually call for very little uncontingent debt to be issued, thus making it completely riskless.
Relation to the literature This paper is primarily related to the literature on agency-based theory of optimal capital structure and managerial compensation: DeMarzo and Sannikov (2006) , DeMarzo and Fishman (2007) , Biais et al. (2007) , among others. We extend the model by allowing for agent dismissal and monitoring of the cash ‡ow with …nancial restructuring, subject to search frictions. Piskorski and Wester…eld (2016) study the impact of monitoring on the optimal contract in the dynamic agency setting, but their monitoring technology is di¤erent. In their model, monitoring can generate an imperfect signal of the manager's resource diversion or shirking. Although such signals remain o¤-equilibrium, monitoring complements performance-based compensation in providing incentives to the manager. In our model, in contrast, monitoring directly substitutes the manager, who is dismissed when the …rm transitions to the monitoring state, which does occur in equilibrium. The dismissal of the manager is an important element of our theory of …nancial restructuring, as in reorganization the manager's equity position in the …rm is wiped out. Tchistyi (2016) shows that a credit line with performance pricing is a part of an optimal capital structure in an agency-based model with correlated cash ‡ows, where the agent has a stronger incentive to divert resources when the cash ‡ow is high. Our analysis provides an alternative explanation of performance pricing based on the risk of a discrete jump in the agent's continuation value at dismissal. In a structural model in the tradition of Leland (1994) , where debt is valued for its tax advantages, Manso et al. (2010) study performance-sensitive debt and show that contingent debt instruments can be useful as a screening device allowing high-growth …rms to signal their type in a separating equilibrium. In the same tradition, Antill and Grenadier (2018) study the choice of leverage and the pricing of debt allowing the …rm to use a bankruptcy reorganization as an alternative to straight liquidation. Our paper complements these studies, as we obtain contingent debt and bankruptcy reorganization as a part of an optimal contract trading o¤ agency and monitoring costs. This paper is also related to the large literature on optimal contracts with information frictions and costly monitoring, which goes back to Townsend (1979) and Gale and Hellwig (1985) in static settings and includes dynamic analyses of Monnet and Quintin (2005) , Wang (2005) , Antinol… and Carli (2015) , , and Varas et al. (2017) , among others. The innovation of our model is to add a search friction in the spirit of Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) and Du¢ e et al. (2005) .
Organization Section 2 describes the contracting environment. Sections 3 and 4 characterize the …rm value and the optimal contract. Section 5 discusses a capital structure implementation. Section 6 computes security values and derives comparative statics. Section 7 concludes.
Model
The contracting problem builds on DeMarzo and Sannikov (2006) , hereafter DS, and extends it to two states: an agency state and a monitoring state. The …rm can switch between the two states subject to search frictions. The agency state is similar to DS except for an additional choice variable, which represents the decision to search for a transition to the monitoring state. In the agency state, an agent/manager/CEO is hired to run the …rm, as in DS. In the monitoring state, the …rm is run by an expert, and the cash ‡ow is public information, i.e., there are no agency frictions, but the …rm is subject to additional monitoring costs. Any negative cash ‡ows are covered by external …nancing, which must be secured during the process of searching for a transition to monitoring.
Cumulative cash ‡ow up to date t, Y t , follows
where Z t is a standard Brownian motion on ( ; F; P ), and > 0 and > 0 are constant.
In the monitored state, an expert runs the …rm and absorbs the risk of the cash ‡ow. The owners compensate the expert and pay the costs of searching for a new manager to reenter the agency state. 4 Net of this compensation, the owners receive the ‡ow of B , which can be negative. The ‡ow cost B 0 covers the expert costs. In the monitoring state, the cash ‡ow is public information, i.e., it cannot be diverted to private use. The ‡ow cost B also covers the cost of searching for an opportunity to exit the monitoring state, back to the agency state, which arrives with intensity > 0. When this opportunity arrives, the owners hire the manager and release the expert, thus avoiding paying the ‡ow cost B .
In the agency state, the agent/manager runs the …rm subject to the standard agency friction. The cash ‡ow is privately observed by the agent. The agent can divert the cash ‡ow to private use. Of each unit diverted, the agent retains 0 < 1 and 1 is wasted. 5
In the agency state, the …rm can also take a costly action of searching for an opportunity to transition to monitoring. In monitoring, the …rm must have …nancing available to cover any negative cash ‡ows. Our key assumption is that such …nancing cannot be obtained instantaneously, but rather only after a search period of random duration. The cost of searching for a transition to monitoring is 0. Conditional on searching, such transitions arrive with intensity > 0. Upon transition, the operations are taken over by the expert, the manager is forced out, possibly with severance S t 0, and the …rm enters the monitoring stage. 6 The …rm discounts at the marker rate r > 0 and the agent at > r. The liquidation value of the …rm is 0 L < r . The manager's outside value, available at dismissal, is R 0.
A contract with a manager consists of ( ; I;Ŷ ; s; S), where is the manager's dismissal date, I t is the nondecreasing process of cumulative payments to the manager,Ŷ t is the process of recommended reporting, s t 2 f0; 1g is the indicator of searching for an expert to replace the agent, and S t is severance. Because recommendingŶ t = Y t at all t is without loss of generality, we will denote a contract simply by ( ; I; s; S).
Dismissal of the agent can be due to liquidation or transition to monitoring. Let L be liquidation date and M be the date of switching into the monitoring state. We have = minf M ; L g.
The agent chooses a reporting process dŶ t dY t to maximize
The contract is incentive compatible (IC) if the strategy of reporting dŶ t = dY t at all t attains a maximum in the above objective.
Under an IC contract, the agency-state payo¤s to the agent and the …rm are
5 For brevity of exposition, we assume that all diverted cash ‡ow is consumed by the agent on the spot. DS
show that this assumption is inessential. Hidden savings can be allowed as long as the rate of return in the hidden account is not too large. 6 We assume that the project can be run either by the manager or by the monitoring expert but not both.
Thus, …ring of the manager is a necessary condition for a transition to monitoring.
where M is the value of the …rm upon entering the monitoring state.
Next, we study the optimal contract.
Firm value in the monitoring stage
We begin by solving for the value the …rm obtains in the monitoring state. In this state, there is no need to provide incentives to the expert, as there is no agency friction. Let^ be the time of arrival of an exit from monitoring (reversion to agency with a new manager). The payo¤ to the …rm in the monitoring state is
where b 0 is the value of starting with a new agent, which we can compute as
To ensure that monitoring forever is not e¢ cient, we assume the monitoring costs to be high enough for the …rm to generate expected losses while in monitoring, i.e., we assume B , which implies M < b 0 . Under this assumption, the value of the …rm in the monitoring state comes exclusively from the expectation of a transition to the agency state and the ‡ow payo¤ losses are covered by external …nancing. Next, we proceed to characterize the optimal contract in the agency state and the value it gives to the …rm.
Optimal contract in the agency stage
We follow the standard approach of using the agent's continuation value as the state variable in the …rm's problem of designing an optimal contract for the agent in the agency state.
Let s t 2 f0; 1g be the indicator of searching for a transition out of the agency state. The agent's continuation value follows
where t is the sensitivity to the reported cash ‡ow, t is the sensitivity to the switch in the state to the monitoring state, and N t is a Poisson process with arrival rate > 0.
The contract is IC if t at all t in the agency state. Given the concavity of the …rm's value function, b(W ), we will have t = all t in the agency state (with or without search). With this sensitivity, we haveŶ t = Y t at all t.
t is the post-arrival value to the agent if the arrival comes when the agent's continuation value is W t . As long as a transition to the monitoring state or liquidation do not occur, we have
where W 0 t = R + S t . At dismissal, the agent's continuation value is delivered by the outside value R and a lump-sum payment S t , as there is no reason to delay payments to the agent beyond the point of dismissal.
The HJB equation for the …rm's value b is
4.1 Optimal severance payment
Proof The optimal S maximizes s Sb 0 (W ) s S = ( b 0 (W ) 1)s S, which is decreasing in S because b is strictly concave and b 0 (W 1 ) = 1, which means b 0 (W ) > 1 at all W < W 1 .
The optimal severance payment to the agent is zero in this model. The smaller the agent's postdismissal value, the larger the loss of value to the agent upon …nding a monitoring opportunity. This loss of value increases the drift in W t in the agency state, which is valuable to the …rm everywhere in the search region, as it reduces the risk of liquidation.
With this simpli…cation, in the interior of [R; W 1 ], the agent's continuation value process W t has constant volatility and drift W t + s t (W t R), which, as we see, has two components. The W t component is compensation for the zero payment ‡ow to the agent at all W < W 1 . The (W t R) component, which is only e¤ective when the …rm searches for monitoring, is compensation for the risk of losing W t R in case the …rm …nds a monitoring opportunity.
With S t = 0, the HJB can be written as
The region of search for monitoring
First, we derive a condition for monitoring to be used in equilibrium.
Denote by O(W ) the value of searching at W , i.e., the di¤erence between searching and not searching in the HJB equation (2):
Let b L denote the value function of a …rm that is permanently denied the option to search for monitoring. This value function is derived in DS. Denote by b L;0 its unique peak value. Suppose now this …rm is about to liquidate at W = R, and at this point it unexpectedly gains the option to search for monitoring. If this …rm chooses to ignore this option, then so will the …rm that is always able to search; meaning the parameters , and B , are such that monitoring is just too costly relative to the liquidation value L. Conversely, if this …rm chooses to search, then monitoring is useful, i.e., it will be used in equilibrium at least in a small neighborhood of R. The condition for this …rm's preference to search is
+ r+ b L;0 . Thus, the necessary and su¢ cient condition for the monitoring technology to be used in equilibrium is
We will maintain this condition throughout.
Second, we partially characterize the region of the state space in which the …rm searches for monitoring under the optimal contract.
Lemma 2 The region of search is an interval (R;W ] withW < W 0 arg max b(W ). 
Veri…cation
The veri…cation argument showing that the solution of the HJB equation that satis…es the boundary conditions given in DS is in fact the …rm's value function is standard. Proof Follows DS with minor changes related to the jump to the value M .
Computation
The agency HJB equation depends on the value of the monitoring stage, M , which in turn depends on b 0 . Yet, thanks to Lemma 2, we can solve the HJB in a single pass going backward from the agent payment boundary.
We can write the …rm's value function in the agency stage as b(W ) = maxfb N S (W ); b S (W )g, where b N S is the value of not searching for transition to monitoring and b S is the value of searching.
The HJB equation for the function b N S is the same as in DS:
From Lemma 2 we have that b(W ) = b N S (W ) for allW W W 1 . Although theW is not known exactly, we know thatW < W 0 . Thus, starting from W 1 we can solve the HJB (5) backwards until the solution reaches its peak. At this point, we have found W 0 and b 0 , and, hence, M . To the left of the peak, we can continue solving the HJB equation (2) allowing for both search and no search, as now, with M known, the value of searching for monitoring is known. 
is met. To the left of this point, searching for a monitoring opportunity maximizes the …rm's value. This value function, which we denoted by b S (W ), solves the HJB equation
with the boundary conditions atW given by
. After reaching R, we update the initial agent payment threshold W 1 depending on whether b S (R) is larger or smaller than L. 
Capital structure implementation
In the agency state, we consider a capital structure similar to DS, but with two new features. First, the credit line (short-term debt) has a performance pricing feature. Second, payments to long-term debt have a component contingent on the …rm's …nancial position, i.e., leverage. This component can be implemented with a contingent bond.
Let x be the ‡ow of payment to long-term debt (regular and contingent together), and let i be the interest rate on the line of credit. Let the credit limit on the credit line be C L , and letC L < C L be a …nancial distress threshold, i.e., the trigger of performance pricing. Let B t denote the balance on the credit line outstanding at t. As in DS, let the agent hold fraction of the …rm's equity.
The agent's problem under capital structure (x; i; ) is to choose a reporting processŶ t and the dividend process Div t to maximize their expected payo¤, where the balance process follows
Proposition 1 Let C L = W 1 R andC L = W 1 W , whereW and W 1 are determined in the optimal contract. Suppose
and
Then the dividend process
the balance process
and the reporting processŶ t = Y t solve the agent's optimization problem under the capital structure (x; i; ).
Proof First, we check that if the agent follows the proposed policy, then (9) holds, where the process (W t ; t 0) is determined by the optimal contract.
For B t = 0, we have W t = W 1 .
For all 0 B t <C L , from (7) and (8), we have i = and x = W 1 . Using (6), we have
With the identity B t + W 1 = W t , we get back the law of motion for W t under the optimal contract: dW t = W t dt dI t + (dŶ t dt). (7) and (8), we have i = + and x = W 1 (W 1 R). Using (6), we have
With the identity B t + W 1 = W t , we get back the law of motion for W t under the optimal contract in the search region:
This shows that if the agent follows the proposed policy, he does as well as in the optimal contract. That he cannot do better follows by contradiction. If he could, we'd be able to construct a diversion policyŶ that would give the agent a higher payo¤ also under the optimal contract, which contradicts the incentive compatibility property of that contract.
The interest rate on the credit line and the long-term debt payment are adjusted when the …rm's …nancial position B t crosses the distress thresholdC L . The rate i goes up, as in most performance pricing contracts. The payment to long-term debt is stepped down.
One way to implement an automatic decrease in payment x at the distress threshold is to issue two classes of long-term debt at date 0: a regular perpetuity with face value D = r 1 ( W 1 (W 1 R)) and the coupon rate r, resulting with a permanent payment of
and a perpetual, contingent, noncumulative bond with face value D cd = r 1 (W 1 R) and the coupon rate r. The contingency feature of this bond suspends (i.e., eliminates without the obligation to pay back later) its coupon payments whenever the …rm is …nancially distressed, i.e., when B t >C L . Together, these two bonds replicate the structure of optimal payment to long-term debt holders, x(B t ). In …nancially sound conditions, B t C L , the total coupon ‡ow, i.e., the sum of coupon payments to the two types of debt, is W 1 . In …nancial distress conditions, B t >C L , the total coupon ‡ow is reduced by
as the coupons to the contingent bond become automatically suspended. Figure 2 illustrates the joint e¤ect of the contingency feature of debt and the performancepricing feature of the credit line. It shows total debt service costs as a function of the draw on the credit line, B t . In the baseline model of DS, the total debt service costs, represented by the red line, have an a¢ ne structure. The constant component is the constant payment to long-term debt, and a linear component is the interest payment on the …rm's credit line, which has a constant slope of . In our model, total debt service costs are discontinuous at the …nancial distress threshold,C L . The payment to long-term debt declines, but the slope of the variable component, i.e., the interest rate on the revolving balance B t , increases from to + . As shown in Figure 2 , the joint e¤ect of the contingency feature and the performance pricing feature is positive for the …rm everywhere in the …nancial distress region. In fact, the optimal amount of contingent debt the …rm issues is determined at the level that ensures the …rm receives a debt service cost relief in the distress region. Indeed, i.e., the suspension of payments to contingent debt outweighs the additional interest charged on the credit line under performance pricing.
In the distress region, the …rm also searches for an opportunity to reorganize. The search costs, , represent preparation costs for bankruptcy reorganization. In particular, the …rm must line up …nancing to cover negative cash ‡ows during the bankruptcy reorganization stage.
In bankruptcy itself, the monitoring and reorganization ‡ow costs are B . Upon transition to bankruptcy, the manager is dismissed with a severance payment of zero. The value of the manager's equity stake in the …rm is zero, as equity is extinguished in bankruptcy and debt holders become …rm owners, which gives the manager the total continuation value of just R. The value of the …rm in bankruptcy is M , which is allocated to long-term debt holders, contingent debt holders, and the revolving debt holders in the order of seniority. Operating losses are covered by external, prearranged …nancing. This …nancing problem is free of the agency friction, thanks to the costly monitoring activities exerted during bankruptcy. As soon as the …rm has an opportunity to transition back to the agency stage, a new manager is hired and a new capital structure is set up with the initial value b 0 to the owners, and the value of W 0 to the new manager. The time spent in bankruptcy captures the delay in creditor negotiations and search for a new manager.
Alternative capital structures
In this capital structure, contingent debt is similar to (noncumulative) preferred equity. The distinction between the two comes from the ex ante commitment by the …rm to make payments to this liability class everywhere in the non-distress region, B t 2 [0;C L ), even when common equity dividends are zero. This distinction, however, is not essential. In the Appendix, we provide an alternative capital structure under which the manager prefers to make payments to this liability class whenever not distressed even if the only consequence for not paying is an onset of search for restructuring.
Provision of …nancial relief to the …rm in distress combined with an increased incentive to pay revolving debt o¤ are essential features of our model. As we have shown, these can be implemented with performance pricing on revolving debt combined with a contingent liability similar to noncumulative contingent debt or preferred equity. Our model, therefore, gives an e¢ ciency-based explanation for why these features are observed in corporate capital structures.
Security values and comparative statics
In order to compute security values and obtain comparative statics results, we follow the approach of DS. The following lemma adapts their method to our model by allowing for the possibility of a jump to a state M .
Lemma 3 Let W t follow the equilibrium law of motion for the manager's continuation value until a stopping time = minf L ; M g. Let g be a ‡ow return function de…ned on [R; W 1 ] and k and F M be real numbers. Then the same function G de…ned on [R; W 1 ] solves both
with boundary conditions G(R) = F L and G 0 (W 1 ) = k, and
Proof Follows the martingale argument of DS.
Market value of securities
Let us denote market value of security 2 fe; d; cd; clg conditional on the current draw on the credit line B by V (B) , where e stands for equity, d for long-term debt, cd for contingent debt, and cl for the credit line. Let us …x the liquidation payo¤s at some nonnegative constants F L; such that P F L; = L, and the reorganization payo¤s at some non-negative constants F M; such that P F M; = M , where the constants respect some speci…c seniority structure of claims. With these terminal payo¤s, the values of securities are as follows:
These values can be computed using the general formula in Lemma 3.
In particular, to compute the value of long-term debt, we use formula of Lemma 3 with the ‡ow return function g(W ) = x d at all W , the value of k = 0, and terminal payo¤s M d = minfD; M g and
r . For contingent debt, we use g(W ) = 1 W >W x cd , and k = 0. Because we have assumed contingent debt to be junior to regular long-term debt, the terminal values for contingent debt are M cd = minfD cd ; M c g and F cd = minfD cd ; F d g, where, we recall, D cd = x cd r . Having veri…ed M cd < D cd and F cd < D cd , the terminal payo¤s for both security classes junior to contingent debt, i.e., the unsecured credit line and equity, are zero. To compute the value of the credit line, we use g(W ) = x d 1 W >W x cd 1 W W , and k = 1. For equity we use g(W ) = 0 at all W and k = 1 . Figure 3 presents a computed example. In this example, the seniority structure is as follows: long-term debt, contingent debt, credit line, equity. Under the parameter values of this example, long-term debt becomes riskless, as its face value D is below both M and L. Contingent debt is risky, with face value D cd higher than M (and hence also L). In both liquidation and reorganization, the short-term unsecured line of credit recovers zero, as does equity. Figure 4 uses the same parametrized example to compute security values in the DS model. In that model, the optimal capital structure has only one kind of long-term debt. In this example, this debt is risky. The introduction of the possibility of monitoring increases the total debt capacity of the …rm, as D + D cd > D DS , and the optimal credit line is shorter. Security values are highly sensitive to the order of seniority in bankruptcy. In our model, in particular, it is easy to see that if both forms of long-term debt are pari-passu to each other, then regular long-term debt is no longer risk-free. The total …rm value, however, as determined by the optimal contract, is independent of the order of seniority of debt claims.
Comparative statics
In this section, we use the approach of Lemma 3 to compute comparative statics of the model. We present the derivation of the comparative statics with respect to the search friction parameter . The comparative statics with respect to other parameters of the model, presented in Table 1 below, are obtained using the same methodology.
The e¤ect of the search friction parameter, , on the …rm's pro…t can be found by di¤erentiating the HJB equation and its boundary conditions. Starting in the no-search region, we have Using the Feynman-Kac formula of Lemma 3, this can be simpli…ed to
where
and S is the stopping time indicating the …rm's …rst entrance into the search region, i.e.,
Similarly, in the search region we have for all W 2 [R;W ]
(10) where M is the …rm value in the monitoring stage with parameter , and, for all W 2 [R;W ],
where = minf N S ; M ; L g is the stopping time indicating the …rm's …rst exit from the search region due to either …nancial recovery ( = N S ), or transition to monitoring ( = M ), or liquidation ( = L ). Thus, we have
Finally, from the de…nition of the value in monitoring, M , we have
The following lemma signs the comparative statics for the value functions and the boundary conditions. 
Rearranging and using (11), we obtain
The left side of (12) is negative under the premise
, which implies G (W ") > 0. Thus, the right side of (12) is strictly positive, which is a contradiction. 
Also, since we have Di¤erentiating the boundary condition rb N S; (W 1 ) + W 1 = , we have
where G S (W ) 1 since W >W (by Lemma 2 again), G S (W ) = 1 and G S (W ) is decreasing. Thus, we have @W @ < 0 if is su¢ ciently small.
Lemma 4 can now be used to derive comparative statics for the optimal capital structure.
Recall that the credit line satis…es
and the contingent bond is D cd = r (W 1 R). Applying the lemma to these expressions, we obtain comparative statics for the capital structure. Table 1 summarizes these results for the credit line, long-term debt, contingent debt, the value for a new manager, and the value of the …rm in the agency stage.
The comparative statics for the distress thresholdC L are nonmonotone. When search frictions are very severe, for example when = is very large, the …rm will only search in a small neighborhood of liquidation, which meansC L is close to C L and the …rm's value function b is close to the DS value function b L over almost all of the domain [R; W 1 ] with a boundary condition at R approaching L. When search friction are very light, for example when is very high, the …rm does not search much either because it can …nd transition to monitoring quickly. In this case,C L is also close to C L and value function is represented by b N S over almost all of the domain [R; W 1 ] with a boundary condition at R approaching M > L. At intermediate levels of search costs, the …rm commences the search for a bankruptcy opportunity early, i.e., the ratioC L =C L is lowest.
Conclusion
Asquith et al. (2005) and Manso et al. (2010) document that, broadly de…ned, performance pricing on debt instruments is a feature used commonly in the practice of corporate …nance. In this paper, we show that performance pricing arises as a part of an optimal credit arrangement when …rms can use a …nancial reorganization procedure similar to Chapter 11 bankruptcy. In an optimal contract, management is dismissed with no severance and the value of equity is wiped out as the …rm enters bankruptcy reorganization. This discrete loss of value is compensated by giving the …rm a relief in its debt service costs during …nancial distress, when the arrival rate of bankruptcy is positive. The role of performance pricing on the …rm's debt obligations is to implement this relief.
denoted by A t , and has the credit limit A. The secondary revolving credit line charges the interest rate + on the outstanding balance B t , and has the limit B.
The covenant structure attached to the above liabilities is as follows. Missing a coupon payment to long-term debt triggers liquidation. Preferred equity dividends p are non-cumulative, i.e., can be paid out at the manager's discretion. Although missing a payment p does not cause default, it triggers the search for reorganization at all times at which p is not paid out. Resumption of preferred dividend payments stops the search. Likewise, a positive balance B t on the secondary credit line triggers the search for reorganization. The primary credit line can be used at the manager's discretion, up to the limit A, with no triggers attached.
The manager holds the fraction of common equity. The manager chooses the common equity cumulative dividend process, Div t , the preferred equity cumulative dividend process, Div p t , a process of drawing upon the secondary credit line, b t , and the cash ‡ow reporting processŶ t .
The manager maximizes
where = min f L ; M g is the stopping time indicating liquidation or transition to reorganization. 
where (W t ; t 0) is the manager's value process obtained as the solution to the optimal contracting problem.
Proof First, we check that if the manager follows the proposed strategy, then (18) holds.
With the credit limits (16) and (17), we have the following boundary conditions. With A t = B t = 0, we have W t = W 1 . With A t = A and B t = 0, we have W t =W . With A t = A and B t = B, we have W t = R.
For all A t 2 [0; A) and B t = 0, the proposed strategy impliesŶ t = Y t , dDiv p t = pdt and db t = 0. Hence (14) implies dB t = 0 and (13) Now we show that the proposed strategy is optimal to the manager. Due to the higher interest rate and the search trigger associated with the secondary line of credit, it is clearly optimal for the manager to not use it unless A t = A. Further, since the maxing out the primary credit line triggers search already, the manager has no longer an incentive to pay preferred dividends p when A t = 0 and B t > 0. As in DS, the manager has no incentive to pay common dividends when balance on revolving lines is positive because he owns fraction of both the dividends and the slack on the credit lines. For the same reason, the manager has no incentive to divert the cash ‡ow.
Further, we need to check that the manager prefers to pay the noncumulative preferred dividend p whenever A t < A. Suspending the payment of pdt triggers search in dt, which costs the manager the expected loss of dt(W t R), but, on the other hand, it allows the manager to reduce the balance A t at the rate pdt, which increases the manager's value W t at the rate pdt. We need to check that the loss is weakly larger than the gain whenever A < A. Since the manager's loss is monotone in W t , it is su¢ cient to check the case with the smallest W t in the preferred dividend payment region, i.e., at W t =W , which takes place when A t = A. Thus, we need to check that (W R) p = (W R); which is true, by (15).
This shows that if the manager follows the proposed policy, he does as well as in the optimal contract. That he cannot do better follows by contradiction. If he could, we'd be able to construct a diversion policyŶ that would give the manager a higher payo¤ also under the optimal contract, which contradicts the incentive compatibility property of that contract.
